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CONFRONTING GOVERNMENTAL IMPUNITY 
AND IMMUNITY “FROM BELOW” 
Lawrence G. Albrecht* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The hierarchy of judicial doctrines advancing governmental 
immunity has created a legal thicket of obstacles for civil and international 
human rights victims to overcome.1  Powerful policy pronouncements 
often accompany judicial decisions dismissing or limiting such 
litigation—policy that reinforces and often expands judicial absolution of 
alleged civil and human rights abuses.  Impunity or qualified immunity 
may triumph regardless of the egregiousness of governmental conduct.  
Missing from this immunity architecture is fulsome judicial consideration 
of the legal interests of victims of injustice and public policy factors 
supporting a more balanced and inclusive legal framework.  This missing 
law circumscribes consideration of unsettled or novel constitutional and 
statutory interpretation and embedded policy assessed from the plaintiff’s 
perspective and impedes the development of law responsive to new 
realities. 
The primary focus of this Article is the quest for judicial recognition 
of this perspective “from below” in the context of qualified immunity 
challenges to civil and human rights quests for justice.2  First, the judicial 
doctrine of qualified immunity and its inherent policy underpinnings 
biased toward the defendant’s perspective will be addressed.3  Several 
significant civil rights cases applying core qualified immunity principles 
                                                
* J.D., Valparaiso University School of Law (1973).  President of First, Albrecht & Blondis, 
S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  The opportunity to present the 2017 Rucker Lecture was a deep 
honor for the author who is ever thankful to return to his academic home since 1965.  The 
author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Bryn I. Baker, J.D., and Alexa C. 
Bradley, J.D., Marquette University Law School (2018), associate attorneys at First, Albrecht 
& Blondis, S.C.
1 Related judicial gate-closing doctrines will also be addressed as pertinent to the overall 
immunity focus.  
2 DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, LETTERS AND PAPERS FROM PRISON 17 (Eberhard Bethge ed., 
Macmillan 1972).  The Article’s title expressly references the perspective of a 1942 Christmas 
essay sent by Lutheran pastor, theologian, and anti-Nazi co-conspirator Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
to family and friends in which he stated:  “We have for once learn[ed] to see the great events 
of world history from below, from the perspective of the outcast, the suspects, the maltreated, 
the powerless, the oppressed, the reviled—in short, from the perspective of those who 
suffer.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Analogous scientific “bottom-up” thinking may “proceed 
from the influence of interpreted experience to the formulation of theoretical 
understanding,” in contrast to foundationalist “top-down thinking,” which descends from 
the power of pre-existing rules and general principles applied to particular contexts.  JOHN 
POLKINGHORNE, EXPLORING REALITY 93 (Yale Univ. Press 2005). 
3 See infra Part II. 
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will also be analyzed.4  Second, recent international human rights 
decisions by the Supreme Court and other federal courts will be analyzed 
to ascertain how the judiciary has responded to specific Congressional 
enactments, which frame the universal tension between governmental 
immunity and remedies for civil and human rights violations.5  As 
pertinent, principles derived from international human rights law, which 
exhibit a remedial policy approach supporting judicial doctrines 
advancing justice “from below,” will be referenced.6  An implicit concern 
throughout this Article is the broadest question of how to assess the 
measure of justice available in an entangled world in which the United 
States’ judiciary is confronted with unique civil and human rights crises, 
but judicial remedies are foreclosed by doctrines that orchestrate a quick 
judicial side-step. 
Viewed within a broad bipolar international legal philosophy lens, the 
prominence of immunity doctrines—including qualified immunity, 
which globally shields state U.S. actors from legal accountability for their 
conduct—is consistent with the core philosophy of legal positivism, which 
reached its zenith in German law under the Nazis.7  Positive law forecloses 
consideration of natural law or ethical or moral values to determine 
whether exercises of governmental power may be judicially constrained.  
As a counter-focus, principles of justice “from below” generally align with 
the fundamental tenets of natural law theology and philosophy associated 
with Thomas Aquinas (and Aristotle and related Greek philosophy), 
which promote contemporary judicial openness to human rights values, 
whether expressly codified or implied under relevant constitutional, 
                                                
4 See infra Part II.A. 
5 See infra Part III. 
6 The author is mindful, of course, of the limited U.S. focus on human rights in this Article 
and affirms the perspective of Nobel Peace Prize winner and former East Timorese leader 
José Ramos-Horta:  “Human rights were not a European invention [].  For thousands of years, 
while Europeans were still living in caves, concepts of human rights and justice were already 
articulated in the teachings of the major Eastern philosophies and traditions.”  Seth Mydans, 
Letter From Asia; In a Contest of Cultures, East Embraces West, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/12/world/letter-from-asia-in-a-contest-of-cultures-
east-embraces-west.html [https://perma.cc/U6AR-P7RH]. 
7 Carl Schmitt, the “Crown Jurist of the Third Reich,” famously wrote:  “The Führer 
protects justice against the worst abuse when he in the moment of danger by force of his 
leadership status as highest judicial authority creates justice directly.”  Detlev Vagts, Carl 
Schmitt’s Ultimate Emergency: The Night of the Long Knives, 87 GERMANIC REV. 203, 206 (2012).  
See generally MICHAEL BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST, GENOCIDE, AND THE LAW, 212–17 (2016) 
(analyzing Carl Schmitt and the “State of exception,” which further empowers executive 
conduct during times of self-declared crisis).  At its logical end, such crises may result in the 
paradox of suspending the Constitution to save the Constitution.  Impunity facilitates this 
path to perdition. 
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statutory, or common law principles.8  Aquinas taught that God’s act of 
bestowing natural law, as a subset of eternal law, was one aspect of divine 
providence and that natural law “constitutes the principles of practical 
rationality” by which human conduct is deemed reasonable or 
unreasonable.9  Natural law encompasses the wisdom of human 
experience, which also resonates with legal pragmatism.10  William 
Blackstone, historically the most influential English legal mind, firmly 
believed in natural law and asserted that any man-made law lacks validity 
if contrary thereto.11  Indeed, the natural law philosophy of inalienable 
rights is enshrined in The Declaration of Independence:  “We hold these 
truths to be self-evident:  that all men are created equal; that they are 
endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalienable rights; that among 
these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”12 
Invocation of this bipolar legal framework is intended to illustrate the 
vast chasm between the perspectives of the parties in the specific cases 
analyzed herein and to provoke fresh insights for future development of 
civil and human rights law.  These competing philosophical and moral 
polarities, particularly prominent in twentieth-century European legal 
                                                
8 The author’s perspective has been influenced by perusal of various Scottish academic 
Gifford Lectures on natural theology and “bottom-up” thinking.  JOHN C. POLKINGHORNE, 
THE FAITH OF A PHYSICIST:  REFLECTIONS OF A BOTTOM-UP THINKER 27 (Fortress Press 1994).  
See Gifford Lectures, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gifford_Lectures 
[https://perma.cc/DEN3-6ZWS].  For a detailed introduction to natural law principles, see 
generally The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 27, 2011), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/ [https://perma.cc/E877-97HB] 
[hereinafter Natural Law].  For a self-described “Ur-history” of natural rights focused on 
developments in the early Middle Ages starting in the twelfth century, see generally Brian 
Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights—Origins and Persistence, 2 NW. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (2004), 
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol2/iss1/2 [https://perma.cc/ 
FVW5-XKXN].  Of course, detailed examination of these three legal philosophies is beyond 
the scope of this Article’s framing analysis. 
9 Natural Law, supra note 8.  See also THOMAS AQUINAS, ON LAW, MORALITY AND POLITICS, 
50–52 (William P. Baumgarth & Richard J. Regan eds., Richard J. Regan trans., Hackett 2003). 
10 See BAZYLER, supra note 7, at 220–25 (addressing the transformation of legal philosopher 
Gustav Radbruch from a positivist to a quasi-naturalist perspective, as is reflected in the 
“Radbruchsche Formal” that extreme injustice is not law).  This theme was also central to the 
famous Hart-Fuller debate during the 1950–60s, which Bazyler also summarizes.  Id. 
11 See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, BOOK 2, 
40 (1793).  Contemporary England understands that the American Revolutionary War was 
fought, in part, to defend “natural law and the inalienable rights of man.”  The American 
Revolution Revisited, ECONOMIST (June 29, 2017), https://www.economist.com/united-
states/2017/06/29/the-american-revolution-revisited [https://perma.cc/Z9LE-CSAC].  
12 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  This also aligns with the 
French historical perspective that the Declaration of Independence reflects the universality 
and rational foundation for individual rights.  See Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Human Rights and State 
Sovereignty: Have the Boundaries Been Significantly Redrawn?, in HUMAN RIGHTS, 
INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE 33, 38 (Philip Alston & Euan MacDonald eds., 2008). 
Albrecht: Confronting Governmental Impunity and Immunity "From Below"
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press,
50 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
culture, remain profoundly important and are often implicit in judicial 
human rights analysis even though not acknowledged as a basis for 
decision-making.13  In the secular United States legal culture, pragmatism 
incorporates analysis of the reasonableness of law based on meaningful 
consideration of the plaintiff’s claims within the contextual consequences 
of expanding legal rights and restricting future governmental conduct.  
This competing bipolar framework of values and the often-mediating role 
of pragmatism will be reviewed in the civil and human rights cases 
addressed herein.14  Justice is polysemous and quantum-like in its 
contextual locus but remains a noble quest for victims of government 
misconduct. 
II.  THE TRIUMPH OF QUALIFIED IMMUNITY “FROM ABOVE”15 
A. Core Qualified Immunity Principles 
The regime of qualified immunity, potentially available to every 
governmental employee sued individually for damages, was significantly 
advanced by the Supreme Court in a decision resolving whether senior 
aides and advisors to the President enjoyed derivative absolute 
immunity.16  In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court determined that 
                                                
13 See generally PHILIPPE SANDS, EAST WEST STREET 81 (Alfred A. Knopf 2016) (providing a 
detailed review of this subject). 
14 It is noteworthy that one of the Supreme Court’s newest members, Justice Gorsuch, was 
strongly influenced by his Oxford dissertation advisor, the natural law scholar John Finnis, 
whose academic work includes significant analysis of Aquinas and natural law.  See, e.g., 
JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS 79, 184 (Oxford Univ. Press 1988); Neil Gorsuch:  The Natural, 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2017, at 21.  Several members of the Supreme Court received a Roman 
Catholic education, as did Justice Scalia whom Justice Gorsuch replaced, although any 
natural law and ethics influence on their respective decision-making analysis in human and 
civil rights cases is amorphic. 
15 This Article does not focus on absolute immunity awarded to governmental officials 
carrying out specific official duties.  For legislatures engaged in legislative tasks, see Tenney 
v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378–79 (1951); prosecutors acting in an official prosecutorial 
capacity, see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976); and judges engaged in judicial 
duties, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359–60, 362–64 (1978).  These decisions are 
grounded on the paramount governmental interests inherent in the exercise of such duties.  
See also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342–44 (2009) (providing further absolute 
immunity analysis).  The primary focus here is qualified immunity and its inherent analytical 
biases favoring stingy treatment of substantive law supporting the plaintiff’s claims, often 
coupled with generous treatment of the governmental actor’s presumed contextual 
knowledge, although the plaintiff’s perspective is irrelevant. 
16 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982) (asserting that presidential aides do 
not qualify for absolute immunity when performing all of their duties).  See also Nixon v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 passim (1982).  At its zenith of power, governmental immunity 
grounded on separation of powers protects the President from the burdens of litigation 
regarding official conduct while in office.  But see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 705–06 (1997) 
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absolute immunity was contextually inappropriate under its “functional” 
approach; instead, the Court concluded that qualified immunity was 
applicable.17  The Court then determined that the subjective aspect of 
qualified immunity, whereby immunity was not available if the official 
took the action with the malicious intent to cause a deprivation of 
constitutional or other rights, was incompatible with the principle that 
insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial.18  Essentially, the Court 
concluded that the previous balancing of values test set forth in Butz v. 
Economou, with its focus on the subjective intent of the governmental actor, 
was too costly: 
Not only are there the general costs of subjecting officials 
to the risks of trial—distraction of officials from their 
governmental duties, inhibition of discretionary action, 
and deterrence of able people from public service.  There 
are special costs to “subjective” inquiries of this kind. 
Immunity generally is available only to officials 
performing discretionary functions.  In contrast with the 
thought processes accompanying “ministerial” tasks, the 
judgments surrounding discretionary action almost 
inevitably are influenced by the decisionmaker’s 
experiences, values, and emotions.  These variables 
explain in part why questions of subjective intent so 
rarely can be decided by summary judgment.19 
Consequently, the Court concluded that all government officials 
performing discretionary duties will be shielded from liability unless they 
violate “clearly established” rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known.20  Qualified immunity shields government officials from 
liability for civil damages when the official acts in a way that he 
                                                
(concluding that it is not a violation of separation of powers to bring action against the 
President while in office); Charlie Savage, Newly Disclosed Clinton-era Memo Says Presidents 
Can Be Indicted, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2017, at A17; Adam Liptak, Trump’s Precedent for 
Immunity Claim? Clinton v. Jones, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2017, at A10. 
17 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 811.  Previously, the Court focused on a functional analysis of 
government conduct and awarded absolute immunity for official capacity conduct 
consistent with the official’s specific duties but not while the official was engaged in other 
duties.  Id. at 810–13. 
18 See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975); Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815–19. 
19 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816.  See also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507–08 (1978).  Butz 
reiterated that “[i]nsubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated” under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure for many reasons, including failure to state a claim under FED. R. CIV. P. 
12(b)(6).  Id. 
20 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
Albrecht: Confronting Governmental Impunity and Immunity "From Below"
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press,
52 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
“reasonably believe[s] to be lawful.”21  This focus, the Court concluded, 
“should avoid excessive disruption of government.”22  In principle, 
“[q]ualified immunity balances two important interests—the need to hold 
public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and 
the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability 
when they perform their duties reasonably.”23  This powerful defensive 
shield provides “ample room for mistaken judgments” and protects “all 
but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”24 
The Court’s desired policy objectives of protecting all government 
actors but the plainly incompetent and those who intentionally violate 
civil rights, and also avoiding perceived disruption of government affairs 
resulting from litigation, reflect the fundamental “justice from above” 
principle contested herein.  The Court’s recital of the paramount 
governmental policy interests at stake in qualified immunity cases was 
expansive, but analytically shallow and a theoretical “top down” 
postulation: 
These social costs include the expenses of litigation, the 
diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, 
and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of 
public office.  Finally, there is the danger that fear of being 
sued will “dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, 
or the most irresponsible [public officials], in the 
unflinching discharge of their duties.” 
 In identifying qualified immunity as the best 
attainable accommodation of competing values . . . we 
relied on the assumption that this standard would permit 
“[i]nsubstantial lawsuits [to] be quickly terminated.”25 
As a consequence of refocusing on the objective reasonableness of the 
government actor’s conduct, contextual pro-government policy 
considerations can become the exclusive judicially considered 
perspective.  The narrow focus of that lens functions like a legal Photoshop 
that crops out the plaintiff’s perspective, which this Article seeks to 
restore.  Harlow was an express policy-based decision.26  Policy is not 
immutable, but Harlow’s analysis has been interpreted as if chiseled into 
the Supreme Court’s foundation. 
                                                
21 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1997). 
22 Id. at 653 n.5. 
23 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). 
24 Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991). 
25 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (citations omitted). 
26 See id. at 819 (explaining the role that public interest played in the Court’s ruling). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 1 [], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol53/iss1/3
2018] Immunity “From Below” 53 
Emphasizing the power of these governmental interests, the Supreme 
Court has held that in order to spare the government actor from the 
unnecessary burdens of litigation, the threshold question of qualified 
immunity should be resolved at the earliest practical stage of litigation.27  
Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, but once raised, the plaintiff 
carries the burden of proof to defeat qualified immunity.28  Consequently, 
if qualified immunity is raised in a motion to dismiss the complaint, the 
plaintiff must legally analyze the pleaded facts to establish that settled 
legal principles demonstrate that:  (1) the defendant violated a 
constitutional or statutory right; and (2) “the right was ‘clearly 
established’ at the time of the challenged conduct” so that it would have 
been “clear to a reasonable officer that her conduct was unlawful in the 
situation.”29  A right is considered to be “clearly established” when 
existing precedent has “placed the statutory or constitutional question 
beyond debate.”30  Previously, “clearly established” law was understood to 
require only that the plaintiff “show either a reasonably analogous case 
that has both articulated the right at issue and applied it to a factual 
circumstance similar to the one at hand or that the violation was so 
obvious that a reasonable person necessarily would have recognized it as 
a violation of the law.”31 
Furthermore, since Saucier, qualified immunity protects government 
officials even if the actor is mistaken as to what the law requires.32  If the 
mistake was reasonable, the government actor is immune, irrespective of 
certitude that the actor’s conduct caused injury to the plaintiff.  A 
government actor’s mistake of law will not necessarily result in a violation 
of the Fourth Amendment, Chief Justice Roberts explained, so long as the 
mistake is “objectively reasonable.”33  Because “reasonable men make 
mistakes of law, too,” an officer’s reasonable mistake of law should not 
automatically result in a violation of the Fourth Amendment because an 
officer’s similar reasonable mistake of fact is permissible, and it would be 
                                                
27 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978). 
28 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815.  As a general matter, defendants carry the burden of proof 
with regard to affirmative defenses raised under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), or otherwise. 
29 See Butz, 438 U.S. at 507–08 (raising qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss); Ashcroft 
v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201–02 (2001).  A court may 
dismiss the action based on analysis of either prong of this test.  Pearson, 555 U.S. at 239.  See 
also William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45, 84 (2018); Michael 
Silverstein, Note, Rebalancing Harlow:  A New Approach to Qualified Immunity in the Fourth 
Amendment, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 495, 518–28 (2017) (criticizing, like this Article, judicial 
expansion of the qualified immunity doctrine). 
30 Ashcroft, 563 U.S. at 741 (emphasis added). 
31 Chan v. Wodnicki, 123 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 1997). 
32 See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. 
33 Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536, 539 (2014). 
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inconsistent with precedent and the text of the Fourth Amendment to hold 
otherwise.34 
As the White Court recently reiterated: 
“[C]learly established law” should not be defined “at a 
high level of generality.”  As this Court explained decades 
ago, the clearly established law must be “particularized” 
to the facts of the case.  Otherwise, “[p]laintiffs would be 
able to convert the rule of qualified immunity . . . into a 
rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging 
violation of extremely abstract rights.”35 
Rarely would a government defense attorney fail to accept this universal 
invitation to attack the plaintiff’s damages claim as “abstract,” not clearly 
established, or not “particularized” to the factual context?irrespective of 
certain causation of injury to the plaintiff.36  Qualified immunity can be 
rotely analyzed by courts as a “rule” of law, elevated above policy, 
notwithstanding the absence of the plaintiff’s perspective and the 
empirically undeveloped governmental burdens of litigation. 
Qualified immunity may be raised at any stage of the legal process, 
and given its enshrined doctrinal power to prevent government officials 
from having to endure the future burdens of litigation, an interlocutory 
appeal from its denial may be taken, which shuts down the trial court 
proceedings.37  Of course, the plaintiff must then suffer the financial and 
case delay burdens of appellate proceedings, but those burdens are 
invisible and not a doctrinal concern.38  A district court’s decision to deny 
                                                
34 Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 536. 
35 White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam) (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2001)). 
36 A related but vacuous policy concern is to avoid creating disincentives for government 
to take innovative actions in new legal contexts.  See Owen Fiss, The Example of America, 119 
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 1, 13–14 (2009), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-
example-of-america [https://perma.cc/22KF-AWNE]. 
37 See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014). 
38 A case litigated by the author illustrates the powerful impact of qualified immunity on 
the course of civil proceedings.  In Chasensky v. Walker, 740 F.3d 1088 (7th Cir. 2014), the 
plaintiff sued Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker in his individual capacity for damages as a 
result of his failure to appoint her to a county clerk position because of, inter alia, his 
interview on Fox News in which he disclosed personal financial information and expressly 
referenced her former bankruptcy proceeding as the basis for his decision.  The Constitution 
protects specific privacy interests and the Equal Protection Clause prohibits irrational 
discrimination.  The Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 525, expressly prohibits employment 
discrimination on the basis of a bankruptcy proceeding.  After over three years of motions 
and legal briefing, two trips to the Seventh Circuit, and an ongoing district court order 
prohibiting the plaintiff from obtaining any discovery, the Seventh Circuit ordered the 
privacy and equal protection claims dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. 
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qualified immunity is deemed a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and 
is immediately appealable unless material facts regarding its applicability 
are genuinely disputed, a rare express exception to the non-appealability 
of interlocutory orders.39  Why this exception?  Because the Supreme 
Court has concluded that qualified immunity serves an important 
governmental function.40  Because the essence of qualified immunity is 
immunity from suit, its core purpose is effectively lost if a case is 
erroneously permitted to go to trial.41 
The foregoing Supreme Court decisions and embedded policy 
sprouting from Harlow have significantly altered the analytical fulcrum 
and balancing of interests to heavily plate the government’s defensive 
armor with positive law principles.42  As these decisions and others 
addressed below demonstrate, plaintiffs’ damages claims can be given 
dismissive “airy-fairy” treatment.  Qualified immunity entrenches the 
legal status quo, which is also a desired outcome for judges favoring an 
“originalist” or “conservative” approach to constitutional interpretation.  
Analysis of the most recent Supreme Court civil rights decisions 
addressing qualified immunity will further delineate these concerns. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Application of Qualified Immunity Principles in 
Recent Civil Rights Cases 
Recent Supreme Court terms included several cases addressing when 
law enforcement officers may be sued for a monetary remedy.  In White v. 
Pauly, the Supreme Court vacated the denial of qualified immunity in a 
Fourth Amendment excessive force case because there was no clearly 
settled principle relevant to the unique factual context to place the 
constitutional claim beyond debate.43  Relying on analysis in Anderson, 
which instructed that “clearly established law must be ‘particularized’ to 
the facts of the case,” the Court reiterated that a reasonable officer must 
know that his conduct would violate a clearly established statutory or 
constitutional right.44  This legal fiction presumes, of course, that the 
officer had previously analyzed all contextually relevant cases 
establishing rights beyond debate before deciding to act.  Because the 
                                                
39 See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 307, 320 (1996) (holding that the agent was not a 
candidate for qualified immunity and denying his appeal).  See also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 
304, 316–17 (1995) (stating the three reasons why orders such as the one in question are not 
appealable). 
40 See White, 137 S. Ct. at 551–52 (explaining that qualified immunity is effectively lost if a 
case is permitted to go to trial, which should not be). 
41 See id. 
42 See, e.g., infra Part II.B (discussing qualified immunity). 
43 White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017) (per curiam). 
44 Id.  See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1997). 
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Court created qualified immunity as a foundational rule of justice from 
above, which “is important to ‘society as a whole,’” the officer in White, 
who arrived late at an active police encounter and shot and killed an 
armed house occupant without giving any warning, was immune.45  Prior 
settled Fourth Amendment law did not categorically prohibit the shooting 
in this presumed novel factual context, and the perspective of the 
deceased regarding his encounter with the officers was functionally 
irrelevant.46  Nor was the enshrined inalienable natural law right to life 
perspective relevant.47 
In County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, the Supreme Court unanimously 
struck down the Ninth Circuit’s pro-plaintiff “provocation rule.”48  The 
Mendez plaintiffs had been awarded almost four million dollars in 
damages following a bench trial on the merits of their Fourth Amendment 
excessive force claims because deputies “intentionally or recklessly 
provoke[d] a violent confrontation [establishing] an independent Fourth 
Amendment violation.”49  The two plaintiffs were living in a property 
shack when they were shot by deputies who invaded—without a warrant 
and without knocking—while searching for another person.50  Three 
Fourth Amendment claims were filed:  (1) warrantless entry; (2) knock-
and-announce violation; and (3) excessive force.51  The Ninth Circuit 
awarded qualified immunity on the knock-and-announce claim but not 
the warrantless entry claim.52  Although the Ninth Circuit also concluded 
that the shooting was reasonable under Graham, nevertheless, it applied 
the “provocation rule” and held the two deputies liable for the use of 
excessive force because they had entered the shack without a warrant, 
which was found to be unreasonable and the proximate cause of the 
shooting.53 
                                                
45 White, 137 S. Ct. at 551.  See also City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 
n.3 (2015). 
46 See White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (reasoning that no settled Fourth Amendment principle 
mandates that an officer second-guess the previous steps already taken by fellow officers). 
47 See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Reviving Saucier:  Prospective Interpretations of Criminal Laws, 14 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 725, 747–48 (explaining that natural law theory requires punishing the 
perpetrator regardless of whether the conduct was defined as illegal). 
48 See County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1543–44 (2017) (stating that the 
provocation rule requires one to look at the subjective intent of the officers). 
49 Id. at 1542. 
50 Id. at 1544–45. 
51 Id. at 1545. 
52 Id. at 1549. 
53 See id. at 1545 (proving unauthorized force requires:  (1) the officer intentionally or 
recklessly provoked a violent response; and (2) that the provocation is an independent 
constitutional violation).  Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1542 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 
(1989)).  Alternatively, the Ninth Circuit found that proximate cause policy principles would 
independently support liability, but that analysis was also reversed. 
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However, the Supreme Court concluded that the “provocation rule” 
altered the “settled and exclusive framework” used to determine whether 
the force used in effecting a seizure conforms with the Fourth Amendment 
because courts must balance an individual’s Fourth Amendment interests 
against the situational governmental interests and decide “whether the 
force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable.’”54  The ultimate 
issue in an excessive force case remains “whether the totality of the 
circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of [search or] seizure.”55  The 
Court held that the “provocation rule” was inconsistent with Graham and 
other Fourth Amendment precedent because “[t]he rule’s fundamental 
flaw is that it uses another constitutional violation to manufacture an 
excessive force claim where one would not otherwise exist.”56  The Court 
also narrowed the scope of proximate cause analysis under Paroline,57 
applicable in civil rights tort cases, by concluding that the Ninth Circuit 
“conflated” it.58  Although not discussed, qualified immunity would have 
foreclosed any award of damages in that case, even if the Fourth 
Amendment was expanded to include the “provocation rule.”59 
At issue in Manuel v. City of Joliet, was whether to analyze a claim 
arising from the plaintiff’s pretrial detention of forty-eight days under the 
Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment.60  The prolonged 
detention was a consequence of false police forensic data regarding pills 
seized during the plaintiff’s traffic stop.61  The Supreme Court held that, 
notwithstanding a state judge’s finding of probable cause and the start of 
legal proceedings, the claim could proceed under the Fourth Amendment 
because the initial probable cause finding was based on fabricated 
evidence.62  A Fourth Amendment claim focuses on the objective 
reasonableness of an officer’s conduct, whereas a Fourteenth Amendment 
substantive due process claim (like an Eighth Amendment post-
conviction claim) incorporates a subjective state of mind component, such 
as deliberate indifference or criminal recklessness, which the plaintiff 
must prove.63  The Court did expressly comment on the “contours and 
                                                
54 County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1546 (2017); Graham v. Connor, 490 
U.S. 386, 396 (1989). 
55 Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1546–47; Tenn. v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985). 
56 Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1546 (emphasis added). 
57 See Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2014). 
58 Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1549. 
59 Id. 
60 Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911, 914 (2017). 
61 Id. at 915. 
62 See id. at 922 (remanding for the lower court to address the rules and elements of a 
Fourth Amendment claim). 
63 Compare Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 306–07 (1994), and Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 
103, 116–19 (1975) (addressing minimum objective standards and procedures for pretrial 
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prerequisites of a § 1983 claim” with an implicit “from below” perspective 
that rejected strict common-law restraints on the scope of civil rights 
claims.64  However, the qualified immunity defense, premised on the 
unsettled status of either claim, looms on remand.65  On remand, the 
Seventh Circuit held that the statute of limitations for the surviving Fourth 
Amendment lack of probable cause claim began upon release from 
detention and remanded the case to the district court where the qualified 
immunity defense looms.66 
Manuel illustrates how the defendant’s state of mind may be a 
significant factor to be considered by plaintiff’s counsel in pleading 
constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983.67  In dissent, Justice Alito 
addressed doctrinal concerns regarding total preclusion of a defendant’s 
state of mind requirement in Fourth Amendment cases: 
[W]hile subjective bad faith, i.e., malice, is the core 
element of a malicious prosecution claim, it is firmly 
established that the Fourth Amendment standard of 
reasonableness is fundamentally objective. . . . These two 
standards—one subjective and the other objective—
cannot co-exist.  In some instances, importing a malice 
requirement into the Fourth Amendment would leave 
                                                
restraints on liberty), with Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (establishing the 
deliberate indifference standard for assessing a defendant’s potentially culpable state of 
mind).  When a post-conviction claim is raised regarding the conditions of confinement, the 
Eighth Amendment’s two-part test involving the objective seriousness of the conditions and 
the subjective state of mind of the defendants are analyzed.  Id.  See also Kingsley v. 
Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2476 (2015) (considering the requisite state of mind for an 
excessive force case).  The Fourteenth Amendment test may be objective or include a 
subjective component depending on the nature of the specific claim.  Id. 
64 Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 920. 
65 For example, officers who knowingly or recklessly submit an affidavit to obtain a search 
or seizure warrant that contains falsehoods may, nevertheless, be awarded qualified 
immunity if the affidavit independently sets forth an objectively reasonable basis to 
demonstrate probable cause under the Fourth Amendment.  Betker v. Gomez, 692 F.3d 854, 
860 (7th Cir. 2012). 
66 Manuel v. City of Joliet, 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018). 
67 The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 
However, neither a state nor a state actor sued in official capacity is a “person” suable under 
§ 1983.  Will v. Mich. Dep't St. Police, 491 U.S. 58, 62 (1989). 
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culpable conduct unpunished.  An officer could act 
unreasonably, thereby violating the Fourth Amendment, 
without even a hint of bad faith.68 
The plaintiff’s state of mind or emotional injury generally remains 
irrelevant to overcoming a qualified immunity defense.  District of 
Columbia v. Wesby69 specifically raised the issue of whether officers can 
discredit a plaintiff’s asserted innocent state of mind and be awarded 
qualified immunity for arresting “trespassers” (sixteen arrestees sued) at 
a house party without a warrant because Fourth Amendment probable 
cause precedent was not clearly established in this context.70  
Consequently, even arguable probable cause for an arrest warrants 
summary judgment based on qualified immunity whenever an officer 
could have suspected that an individual might be lying about his 
identity.71  The doctrine of qualified immunity is now even further 
unmoored from its original purpose of granting immunity only in qualified 
circumstances so as to not undermine core remedial justice principles. 
Another recent example of this unmooring was Kisela v. Hughes.72  The 
Court decided to blanket a law enforcement officer in qualified immunity 
when the officer shot the plaintiff four times without warning while she 
was brandishing a kitchen knife at another woman.73  The Court stated 
that although the officer was not in apparent danger, it was not clearly 
established that shooting the plaintiff to protect another person would 
violate the Fourth Amendment.74  However, in dissent, Justice Sotomayor, 
joined by Justice Ginsburg, argued that the majority “sidesteps” inquiring 
into the reasonableness of the officer’s action, which reflects “a one-sided 
approach to qualified immunity [which] transforms the doctrine into an 
absolute shield . . . gutting the deterrent effect of the Fourth 
Amendment.”75  The dissent would have denied qualified immunity 
based on the officer’s unreasonable action in shooting a woman who 
                                                
68 Manuel, 137 S. Ct. at 925. 
69 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 593 (2018).  
70 See id. at 585 (describing the issues the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve 
related to qualified immunity of the officers). 
71 See id. at 592–93.  See also Muhammad v. Pearson, 900 F.3d 898, 909 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(stating that any reasonable subjective uncertainty about a person’s identity “points toward 
qualified immunity”). 
72 Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148 (2018) (per curiam). 
73 Id. at 1151–52. 
74 Id. at 1153. The Court continued to hold open the question of whether a Court of 
Appeals’ internal precedents may constitute “clearly established law.”  Id. 
75 Id. at 1158, 1162 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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posed no objective threat to him or others, was not suspected of a crime, 
and who remained calm during the encounter.76 
C. Plenary Qualified Immunity Policy Analysis Should Both Minimize the 
“Clearly Established” Law Mandate and Incorporate Judicial Consideration 
of the Plaintiff’s Injury and Right to a Remedy  
Section 1983 of the United States Code is the primary remedial vehicle 
for asserting tort liability for damages against government actors under 
the Constitution and federal statutory provisions in the foregoing civil 
rights cases.77  Once liability for damages is legally established, proximate 
cause tort analysis applies and includes consideration of several policy 
factors, some favoring an award of damages and justice for the victim even 
in the absence of certitude regarding the extent of resultant injuries.78  
Although proximate cause analysis only enters the legal process after 
judicial denial of qualified immunity and other defenses, nevertheless, the 
interests of the plaintiff reappear in the legal process.79  A successful 
assertion of qualified immunity functions like a lacuna that forecloses 
analysis of the plaintiff’s specific legal interests and favorable policy 
factors inherent in proximate cause analysis and the ultimate liability 
question.  Foreclosing a jury’s liability determination authority also 
precludes the award of remedial relief, including punitive damages, 
which enforce strong public policy supporting punishment and 
deterrence of future violation of rights.80 
Fearing qualified immunity may preclude any judicial analysis that 
incorporates their clients’ perspective “from below,” civil rights attorneys 
are often loathe to file cases seeking to expand substantive legal principles 
                                                
76 Id. at 1157 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
77 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).  Interestingly, when § 1983 was passed by Congress in 1871 no 
companion statutory qualified immunity limitation was enacted.  Yet, the Supreme Court 
sweeps the common law then in existence to determine who may be entitled to qualified 
immunity.  See Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 384 (2012) (reasoning that the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871 did not abrogate common-law immunity).  See also Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 
345–46 (1983); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341, U.S. 367, 376 (1951).  Further, in Imbler v. Pachtman, 
the Supreme Court relied heavily on cases decided after 1871, in order to bestow broad 
immunity upon public prosecutors when sued for common-law torts.  Imbler v. Pachtman, 
424 U.S. 409, 419–31 (1976). 
78 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2524–25 (2013).  See also Gayton 
v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 624 (7th Cir. 2010).  Causation is generally a jury issue and certitude 
of injury is not required.  Id. 
79 See Karen Blum, The Qualified Immunity Defense:  What’s “Clearly Established” and What is 
Not, TOURO L. REV. 501, 503 (2008) (explaining the exception to the clearly established right 
standard when an official relies on the legal advice of counsel). 
80 See Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence:  When and How Much?, ALA. L. 
REV., 1143, 1146–47 (1989) (recognizing deterrence as a goal of punitive damages). 
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and damages remedies.81  The supporting legal theory may be deemed 
novel or relevant precedents may not be factually analogous, inviting 
defendants to assert qualified immunity and escape any accountability.82  
The phalanx of additional affirmative defenses available, though not 
unique to civil rights cases, also inhibits prosecution of civil rights cases 
because of the extraordinary time and expenses inherently involved in 
playing defense against the myriad of routine motions to dismiss and 
affirmative defenses to be encountered.83  This legal culture contributes to 
the stagnation of legal development in response to new societal, political, 
and economic developments.  Qualified immunity is “anti-textual” and 
exclusively judge-made law based on policy.84  Consequently, policy 
considerations “from below” should be embedded in the analysis.  They 
are absent.  From a plaintiff’s perspective, why should the court consider 
whether the underlying law was previously “clearly established” if a 
violation thereof and consequential damages can be proven, even if the 
claim is unprecedented?85  Why should the defendant’s state of mind often 
gain the paramount legal focus in Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual 
punishment cases, while the victim’s subjective state of suffering loses 
consideration in determining whether a case should proceed?86  
Furthermore, why must qualified immunity be expanded to also shield 
certain private actors in symbiotic relationships with the government?87  
These questions express the limited judicial policy consciousness inherent 
in qualified immunity contexts, which systemically tilts the balance of 
competing factors in favor of governmental interests.88  Rote incantation 
                                                
81 See James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma:  Constitutional Tort 
Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1623–24 (2011) (associating qualified 
immunity claims and nominal damages). 
82 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 642 (1997). 
83 These defenses only multiply if the plaintiff raises a state law tort or related claim 
because each state has its own regime of governmental immunity premised on the need for 
government to function effectively without fear of litigation resulting from discretionary 
decision-making.  Stingy judicial interpretations of the “ministerial duty” exception to 
immunity further expands the scope of discretionary decision-making immunity.  See David 
T. Prosser, Jr., Reining in Governmental Immunity, THE VERDICT, Fall 2016, at 39, for a frank 
acknowledgment of this point by a former Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice. 
84 McNair v. Coffey, 234 F.3d 352, 356 (7th Cir. 2000). 
85 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735–36 (2011). 
86 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (noting that having the proper state of 
mind is required to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation). 
87 See Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1663–64 (2012) (setting forth a historical inquiry as 
to whether the private actor may have enjoyed common-law immunity in 1871 when § 1983 
was enacted).  See also Melchert v. Pro Elec. Contractors, 892 N.W.2d 710, 725 (Wis. 2017) 
(holding that a private contractor was entitled to governmental immunity under state law 
for property damages caused while carrying out government contractual specifications). 
88 Qualified immunity does not apply in cases seeking only declaratory or injunctive 
relief; however, courts have never explained why the paramount goal of sparing the 
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of nineteenth century common law immunity policy principles minimizes 
consciousness of the plaintiff’s perspective.89 
Qualified immunity policy factors also ignore the legal reality that 
damages remedies against government officials acting within the scope of 
their employment duties are generally indemnified by the employing 
governmental entity, which is consistent with the remedial purpose of 
civil rights laws that victims actually receive justice.90  It has been well-
settled since Bell v. Hood that “[w]here legal rights have been invaded, and 
a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasions, 
federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong 
done.”91  Socialized compensation can be viewed as a measure of justice 
“from below.”92  
It is also noteworthy that Justice Sotomayor has expressly criticized 
the willingness of the Supreme Court to accept cases in which qualified 
immunity has been denied, while rarely accepting cases challenging the 
grant of qualified immunity: 
It also continues a disturbing trend regarding the use of 
this Court’s resources.  We have not hesitated to 
summarily reverse courts for wrongly denying officers 
the protection of qualified immunity in cases involving 
the use of force. . . . But we rarely intervene where courts 
wrongly afford officers the benefit of qualified immunity 
in these same cases.  The erroneous grant of summary 
judgment in qualified immunity cases imposes no less 
harm on “society as a whole,” . . . than does the erroneous 
denial of summary judgment in such cases.  We took one 
step toward addressing this asymmetry in Tolan. . . . We 
take one step back today.93 
                                                
government from the burdens of litigation should not apply in all litigation.  Pfander, supra 
note 81, at 1633–34.  Establishing the right to a damages remedy generally requires the same 
litigation burdens as establishing liability for purposes of declaratory or injunctive relief.  Id. 
89 See Pfander, supra note 81, at 1638 (noting that government liability has roots in the 
nineteenth century). 
90 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-13-4-1 (Westlaw through 2018); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 825 
(Westlaw through 2018) (providing examples of state indemnification statutes). 
91 Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 774 (1946). 
92 See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856, 1866 (2017) (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 
438 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)) (recognizing the existence of social costs in government 
accountability cases).  To the contrary, the plurality opinion in Abbasi concluded that 
indemnification is one of many “substantial costs” the government must bear in litigating 
damages claims.  
93 Salazar-Limon v. City of Houston, 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1282–83 (2017) (citations omitted). 
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In Tolan, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s summary 
judgment grant of qualified immunity because of the lower court’s 
egregious dismissive treatment of the plaintiff’s opposing evidence, and 
the Court implicitly acknowledged the asymmetric treatment of plaintiffs 
and defendants in qualified immunity summary judgment analysis.94  But 
that was a very rare case, indeed. 
Largely ignored in recent Supreme Court decisions is the Pearson 
Court’s counter-balancing directive “to hold public officials accountable 
when they exercise power irresponsibly.”95  Restoring legal consciousness 
of this directive is the pervasive theme of this Article.96  However, 
governmental immunity remains the uber-powerful counter-force.  In 
moral language, qualified immunity represents the triumph of amoral 
governmental power over human values.  This fulsome judicial minting 
of qualified immunity and related positivist doctrines will now be 
analyzed in recent human rights cases to assess even broader doctrinal 
expansion of the governmental impunity template to international 
conduct.97 
III.  JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF SOVEREIGN AND QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND 
RELATED POLICY-BASED DEFENSES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
CASES 
This Article’s focus now expansively shifts to consider legal principles 
and embedded policy pronouncements in Supreme Court and selected 
federal court decisions awarding governmental immunity or otherwise 
curtailing remedies for international human rights abuses.98  Whether new 
                                                
94 Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1868 (2014) (per curiam). 
95 Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 815. 
96 To align with “bottom-up” thinking, immunity analysis should proceed from “the 
basement of evidence and experience” wherein each plaintiff is uniquely legally situated to 
inform “higher” general legal principles favoring governmental power.  JOHN 
POLKINGHORNE, FAITH, SCIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING 203 (Yale Univ. Press 2000). 
97 See infra Part III.  With respect to the immunity focus of this Article, a bright line does 
not separate civil rights and human rights cases.  Often, cases raise both sets of claims.  For 
example, see Medellin v. Texas (Medellin I), 552 U.S. 491, 500 (2008), and Medellin v. Texas 
(Medellin II), 554 U.S. 759, 759–60 (2008), wherein claims were raised under both the U.S. 
Constitution and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, art. 36.1(b), and the 
subsequent series of related challenges by foreign nationals who claimed they were detained 
without proper timely notice to respective consular officials, including Mordi v. Zeigler, 770 
F.3d 1161, 1167 (7th Cir. 2014), in which the specific Vienna Convention claim was dismissed 
on qualified immunity grounds. 
98 See infra Part III.A.  The primary purpose of Part III is to demonstrate that the Supreme 
Court’s application of the full panoply of immunity doctrines will be even more pronounced 
in cases involving asserted national security interests or military conduct, whether within or 
outside the United States.  Cases seeking to impose governmental and individual liability for 
international human rights violations are often dismissed on other powerful doctrinal 
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norms of liability are set forth in Congressional enactments that are 
relevant or responsive to recent geopolitical events also will be addressed 
within this immunity analysis.99  
A. International Human Rights Law Openings to Justice “From Below”? 
Multitudes of human rights cases have been filed in federal courts in 
recent years, raising a panorama of novel international and domestic legal 
claims.  As an initial matter, it must be noted that in a trio of cases the 
Supreme Court has checked the President’s national security power 
asserted in the wake of September 11.  In Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that 
federal courts have jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus challenges to 
the legality of detaining foreign nationals at Guantánamo Bay.100  In Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that the President cannot hold U.S. 
citizens as “enemy combatant[s]” indefinitely without affording them a 
meaningful opportunity to defend themselves, which comports with basic 
due process principles.101  Further, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme 
Court restricted the President’s power to create special military 
commissions for enemy detainees at Guantánamo and held that the 
Geneva Conventions apply to al-Qaeda detainees (and presumably other 
alleged foreign terrorist organization members).102  Some legal 
commentators were strident in their support of executive branch 
authoritarianism and impunity from legal challenge in response to Hamdi 
and in anticipation of the Court’s ruling in Hamdan.103 
                                                
grounds including state secrets, political question, or other policy grounds not addressed 
herein. 
99 See infra Part III.B.  Analysis on this point is limited to a summary of the relationship 
between international human rights events and immunity principles in prominent selected 
cases, rather than an exhaustive analysis of all relevant cases. 
100 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 481 (2004) (reasoning that citizenship is not a factor to 
determine whether detainees at Guantánamo Bay can invoke federal court). 
101 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
famously stated in her plurality opinion:  “a state of war is not a blank check for the President 
when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”  Id. at 536. 
102 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629–35 (2006).  See also David Scheffer, Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld: The Supreme Court Affirms International Law, JURIST (June 30, 2006), 
http://www.jurist.org/forum/2006/06/hamdan-v-rumsfeld-supreme-court.php 
[https://perma.cc/8WC8-HBHL] (recognizing that international law is embedded in U.S. 
law).  The Court’s detailed analysis of the relevant controlling provision of the Geneva 
Convention of 1949 may be a significant judicial milestone regarding the incorporation of 
international law.  
103 See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood, Rule of Law:  Judicial Overreach, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2004, at 
A24; David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Geneva Convention and POWs, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 
16, 2004), http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20041115-
091908-8539-r [https://perma.cc/2TJU-3SVJ]. 
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In a fourth pertinent decision, Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court 
struck down parts of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and held that 
foreign detainees at Guantánamo have a right to judicial review under a 
three-part balancing of interests test.104  The Court reasoned:  “[t]o hold 
that the political branches have the power to switch the Constitution on or 
off at will . . . [would] lead[] to a regime in which Congress and the 
President, not this Court, say ‘what the law is.’”105  Thus, government and 
military conduct that allegedly violates human rights under the 
Constitution is not inherently absolutely immune from legal challenge.106  
While damages were not at issue before the Supreme Court in these cases, 
retired Justice John Paul Stevens, who authored the majority opinion in 
Hamdan, has proposed that “certain” Guantánamo Bay detainees should 
receive reparations analogous to those received by Japanese-Americans 
detained during World War II.107 
Former Seventh Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner, who criticized the 
Hamdan ruling, pragmatically argued for greater executive branch 
authority to confront terrorist threats, although within the pragmatic 
                                                
104 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765–66 (2008) (prohibiting government officials 
from manipulating the standards used to restrain their powers).  In this habeas corpus 
proceeding, the Court articulated a balancing test regarding application of the Constitution’s 
Suspension Clause:  “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the 
process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where 
apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in 
resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ.”  Id. at 766.  Lakhdar Boumediene and fellow 
prisoner Mustafa Ait Idir published an account of their experiences in Guantánamo entitled 
WITNESSES OF THE UNSEEN:  SEVEN YEARS IN GUANTÁNAMO (Redwood Press 2017).  See also 
Sabrina Toppa, I Want Americans to Know That Guantánamo Happened Not to Monsters, but to 
Men, MOTHER JONES (May 6, 2017), http://www.motherjones.com/media/2017/05/ 
lakhdar-boumediene-guantanamo-book-witnesses-of-the-unseen/ [https://perma.cc/ 
BB93-BHW2] (describing Bourmediene’s treatment in Guantánamo Bay).  See also Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 10 U.S.C. § 94849 (2006). 
105 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765. 
106 One commentator expressly opined that Boumediene was an express rejection of Carl 
Schmitt’s positivist legal philosophy.  See Scott Horton, A Setback for the State of Exception, 
HARPER’S MAG. (June 13, 2008), https://harpers.org/blog/2008/06/a-setback-for-the-state-
of-exception/ [perma.cc/4JND-A7JN] (comparing the liberties George W. Bush attempted 
to take with checks and balances during war time, which the Court struck down, to Schmitt’s 
legal thinking).  See infra note 124 (discussing Carl Schmitt further). 
107 See Mark Berman, John Paul Stevens Says Some Guantanamo Detainees Should Be Given 
Reparations, WASH. POST (May 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2015/05/05/john-paul-stevens-says-some-guantanamo-bay-detainees-should-
be-given-reparations/ [https://perma.cc/5MFU-C6LG].  See also Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); 50a U.S.C. § 1989b (1988); Irvin Molotsky, Senate Votes to 
Compensate Japanese-Americans Internees, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 1988), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/21/us/senate-votes-to-compensate-japanese-
american-internees.html [https://perma.cc/4Q5J-85QU].  Japanese-Americans detained 
during World War II waited 46 years before receiving reparations. 
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context of counter-weighing competing individual and moral interests.108  
District Court Judge Jed S. Rakoff, however, has specifically critiqued “the 
shallowness of the judicial response to executive excesses committed in 
the name of national security.”109  This stark conclusion aptly summarizes 
Owen Fiss’s circumspect and somewhat gloomy survey of related post-
September 11 constitutional developments that Judge Rakoff reviewed.110 
B. Recent Human Rights Decisions and the Future Immunity Landscape 
Individual government actors are often named defendants in human 
rights cases, while other cases focus on the conduct of corporations or 
private entities acting jointly with, or separate from, government actors.  
Sovereign immunity, qualified immunity, and the pastiche of other gate-
closing doctrines are thus raised in more novel and expansive contexts.111  
How courts have analyzed immunity and related defenses, with or 
without judicial consciousness of the justice “from below” counter-point, 
is the focus of the following analysis.  Recall, however, that rote recital of 
an immunity defense may require a court to dip but one toe in the judicial 
decision-making pool.112 
1. The Triumph of National Security Interests over Human Rights 
Remains Intact  
The doctrines of immunity and separation of powers triumphed in the 
recent Supreme Court decision in Ziglar v. Abbasi, which consolidated 
three cases involving six non-citizen Muslim men arrested and detained 
                                                
108 See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT (Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (claiming that 
there should be modification to constitutional rights in times of crisis like war).  See also Emily 
Bazelon, Maximum Security, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Sept. 10, 2006, at 29. 
109 Jed S. Rakoff, ‘Terror’ and Everybody’s Rights, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Sept. 29, 2016), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/09/29/terror-and-everybodys-rights/ 
[https://perma.cc/XC7D-BLSZ]. 
110 OWEN FISS, A WAR LIKE NO OTHER:  THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF TERROR 164–67 
(2015).  The preceding quartet of Supreme Court cases are given extensive analysis therein. 
111 Lewis v. Clarke, 137 S. Ct. 1285, 1290–94 (2017).  For example, in Lewis, a Mohegan tribal 
member defendant who was sued in his individual capacity sought to assert tribal sovereign 
immunity.  The Supreme Court reiterated that in a civil rights suit against a state officer in 
his individual capacity, the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable.  See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 
21, 25 (1991) (directing courts to focus on who the real defendant in interest is in determining 
whether sovereign immunity bars the case).  An official capacity suit for damages against a 
state official, however, implicates the Eleventh Amendment, which immunizes state 
sovereignty from damages suits in federal court, subject to limited exceptions.  See Kentucky 
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (demonstrating that an official capacity suit is a suit 
against an entity, rather than an individual). 
112 See supra Parts II.A, II.C (analyzing significant civil rights cases applying core qualified 
immunity principles). 
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in solitary confinement in the heart of Brooklyn for months following the 
terrorist attacks of September 11.113  These men alleged that they were 
tortured, subjected to multiple physical assaults and other abuses, and 
endured inhumane detention conditions.  They brought multiple Bivens 
damages claims under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and a 
conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for violation of their equal 
protection rights.114  The Court’s plurality opinion, authored by Justice 
Kennedy, rejected the advocated expansion of Bivens because it would 
contextually violate “separation-of-powers principles for a court . . . to 
create and enforce a cause of action for damages against federal officials 
in order to remedy a constitutional violation.”115  Claims that challenge 
national security or immigration policy or practices are particularly 
improper for courts because interpretation interferes with presidential or 
congressional powers and expertise.116  Courts must also defer to the 
governmental costs of allowing such claims to be litigated:  “[c]laims 
against federal officials often create substantial costs, in the form of 
defense and indemnification.”117  The counter-balancing cost of denying 
                                                
113 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (per curiam).  Abbasi drew swift media attention.  
See, e.g., Editorial, The Justices Act Like Grown-Ups, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2017, at A16; Adam 
Liptak, Supreme Court Says Bush Officials Cannot Be Sued for Post-9/11 Policies, N.Y. TIMES, June 
20, 2017, at A15; Richard Wolf, Bush Officials Aren’t Liable for 9/11 Detentions, USA TODAY, 
June 20, 2017, at 8A. 
114 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents Fed. Bureau Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  In 
Bivens, the Court authorized judicial creation of a constitutional claim for damages against a 
federal officer or employee, albeit in specific, limited contexts.  Bivens claims have been 
extended to encompass other claims.  See, e.g., Davis v. Passmon, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) 
(extending Bivens to cover due process employment claims); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 
(1980) (allowing Bivens to cover Eighth Amendment inmate claims).  But see, e.g., United 
States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (refusing to allow Bivens to cover personal injury claims 
by military personnel).  See also 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2010) (“If two or more persons in any 
State or Territory conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any 
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and 
immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted 
authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State 
or Territory the equal protection of the laws; . . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in this 
section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance 
of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or 
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the 
party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by 
such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.”). 
115 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856.  Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch did not participate 
in the case. 
116 Governmental interest in preserving national security remains “an urgent objective of 
the highest order.”  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010). 
117 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1856.   
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justice to the victims of these detailed human rights stains was only briefly 
mentioned.118 
Further, the Court granted qualified immunity on the asserted 
conspiracy claims for two reasons.  First, there was no clearly established 
law on whether the same executive branch employees or agents are distinct 
enough to conspire within the meaning of § 1985(3).119  Second, open 
communication among federal officials should be encouraged regarding 
policy decision-making, particularly in an asserted national security 
context.120  Unaddressed in this intellectual arabesque was why such 
communication should be legally encouraged when the net result was 
torture.  One answer may be the continuing vitality of autoritas, non veritas, 
facit legem, which stands for the idea that positivist exercises of power, not 
virtue, make the law and immunize the actors.121 
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg vehemently dissented, and set forth a 
balanced and reflective assessment of the competing interests at stake.122  
According to the dissent, “History tells us of far too many instances where 
the Executive or Legislative Branch took actions during time of war that, 
on later examination, turned out unnecessarily and unreasonably to have 
deprived American citizens of basic constitutional rights.”123  The policy 
analysis in Abbasi resonates with the positivist “state of exception” legal 
                                                
118 Governmental assertion of “special factors,” analyzed in Bivens, will likely preclude 
creating a claim for damages directly under the Constitution and require express 
Congressional authorization.  See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 44 (1980).  See also FISS, supra 
note 110, at 184–92 (noting “special factors” favoring creating a claim for damages have been 
tightly circumscribed in Supreme Court Bivens-related decisions).  
119 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1868–69. 
120 Id. at 1868. 
121 A stark comparator is the Chinese legal system, which has made significant progress 
expanding the availability of remedies in certain types of legal proceedings against the 
government while maintaining absolute impunity from challenges to state authority in 
military or political matters.  See See You in Court, ECONOMIST, Sept. 30, 2017, at 41. 
122 Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1874–75 (2017) (Breyer, J. dissenting).  Justice Breyer is 
receptive to the limited import, or “cross-referencing,” of international legal principles and 
potentially binding international law in federal court statutory decisions.  See STEPHEN G. 
BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD:  AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 245 
(Alfred A. Knopf 2015).  Justice Breyer asserted that “cross-referencing will speed the 
development of ‘clusters’ or ‘pockets’ of legally like-minded nations whose judges learn 
things from one another . . . .”  Id.  Justice Gorsuch, appearing with Justice Breyer at Harvard 
University, also embraced this perspective in his first public remarks since joining the 
Supreme Court and noted similarities between United States and English judicial 
philosophy:  “The similarities are profound . . . great respect for certain human rights.  We 
believe in certain forms of limited government, separation of powers.”  See Adam Liptak, 
Gorsuch Rejects Doubts Over ‘Rule of Law Today,’ N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2017, at A17 (emphasis 
added). 
123 Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1884. 
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philosophy of Carl Schmitt.124  Even rote invocation of national security 
interests by the government, whether evidence-based or an appeal to fear 
and prejudice, dramatically shifts the judicial balance of interests and 
equities to enhance the asserted government interests.125 
Alleged national security concerns, contested as fueled solely by 
discrimination, also permeated the broader context of two Fourth Circuit 
and Ninth Circuit challenges consolidated in Trump v. International Refugee 
Assistance Project.126  In Trump, the Supreme Court partially vacated 
injunctions and ordered restricted enforcement of an Executive Order 
which, inter alia, suspended entry into the United States of individuals 
from six predominantly Muslim countries for ninety days.127  The 
Supreme Court refused to stay or vacate a Hawaii District Court order 
interpreting Trump to authorize grandparents and other relatives of 
American residents to enter the country while the plenary legal 
proceedings progressed.128  In September 2017, the Ninth Circuit held that 
                                                
124 Throughout his dozens of published books and articles supporting the Third Reich, Carl 
Schmitt grounded his fealty to Hitler and executive power on the positivist principle that 
authority makes law, not virtue. See Vagts, supra note 7, at 87.  Even today Schmitt has both 
influence and credibility.  See, e.g., Paul Gottfried, The Concept of Carl Schmitt, AM. 
CONSERVATIVE (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-
concept-of-carl-schmitt/ [https://perma.cc/G5HY-BLXN]. 
125 Indeed, this positivist perspective is expansive in conservative legal thinking, which 
even analyzes human rights law as a “dangerous game” when state sovereignty is 
challenged by international conduct seeking to halt human rights abuses.  See Ingrid Wuerth, 
Lecture, International Law and Peace Among Nations, MARQ. UNIV. L. SCH. (2017), https://law-
media.marquette.edu/Mediasite/Play/e5e7f191068c4795bb51130415c5eb7e1d 
[https://perma.cc/UL5S-GC7T]. 
126 See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017) (per curiam).  
The Court also paid homage to Justice Scalia’s prior statement that the balance of equities 
must also encompass “the interests of the public at large.”  Id. (citing Barnes v. E-Sys, Inc. 
Grp. Hosp. Med. & Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U.S. 1301, 1305 (1991) (Scalia, J., in chambers)).  At 
its irrational extreme and without principled judicial braking, discriminatory fears of “the 
other,” including foreign national children already in the U.S., leads down a legal path 
toward “Exxilon justice.”  See Doctor Who:  Death to the Daleks (BBC television broadcast Feb. 
23, 1974).  The evidentiary metrics used for measuring the public interest remain amorphic 
but may elevate political fear-mongering and prejudice over the perspectives of minority 
communities. 
127 See Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017) (listing the countries 
relevant to the travel ban as Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen). 
128 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 34 (July 19, 2017) (denying motion for clarification 
order).  See also Adam Liptak, Trump Refugee Restrictions Allowed for Now; Ban on Grandparents 
Is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2017, at A16 (noting that while legal challenges to the travel 
ban proceeded, grandparents and other relatives of American citizens would be exempt from 
the travel ban); Debra Cassens Weiss, Supreme Court Allows More Extended-Family Exemptions 
to Travel Ban, ABA J. (July 19, 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
supreme_court_allows_grandparent_exemption_to_travel_ban [https://perma.cc/4GUD-
SDH3].  Justice Ginsburg frankly stated that the President’s policy was “too restrictive” to be 
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grandparents, grandchildren, brothers- and sisters-in-law, uncles, aunts, 
nieces, nephews, cousins, and refugees working with a resettlement 
agency satisfy the “bona fide relationship” requirement imposed by the 
executive order.129  Subsequently, Justice Kennedy issued a temporary 
order allowing exclusion of most refugees,130 and the Supreme Court 
issued an order in both pending cases requiring briefing on whether a 
Presidential Proclamation (“Travel Ban 3.0”), further amending and 
expanding the two prior travel bans, rendered the cases moot.131 
The continuing vitality of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer and 
its progeny as a brake on Presidential power to make law remains 
uncertain in this context.132  Dozens of federal court lawsuits challenging 
the President’s respective immigration and refugee Executive Orders and 
Proclamations have been filed.133  In 2018, the Supreme Court issued a 
decision upholding the validity of the President’s Orders and 
Proclamations in Trump v. Hawaii.134  In a 5-4 decision, the majority 
concluded that the President had the constitutional authority to prevent 
the entry of individuals from six majority-Muslim nations because the 
                                                
enforceable, given the family interests at stake.  Adam Liptak, On Justice Ginsburg’s Summer 
Docket:  Blunt Talk on Big Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2017, at A13. 
129 Hawaii v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646, 655 (9th Cir. 2017).  See also Miriam Jordan, Court Ruling 
Opens Door Once Closed To Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2017, at A9. 
130 See Adam Liptak, Justices Halt Move to Lift Parts of Ban On Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 
2017, at A19; Matt Zapotosky, Supreme Court Allows Broad Enforcement of Travel Ban—At Least 




131 See Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 138 S. Ct. 50 (Sept. 25, 2017); Robert 
Barnes, Administration Says Supreme Court Should Stop Review of Past Travel Bans, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/administration-
says-supreme-court-should-stop-review-of-past-travel-bans/2017/10/05/f5d07c68-a9e4-
11e7-b3aa-c0e2e1d41e38_story.html?utm_term=.d4a9039fbba7 [https://perma.cc/Y6Z8-
FXLB] (mentioning that courts have asked for new briefing regarding whether the issue is 
moot due to Trump’s replacement of the travel ban); Michael D. Shear et al., Justices Cancel 
Hearing on Travel Ban as Questions Linger on New Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2017, at A12 
(discussing the fact that courts have been reluctant to hear issues relating to the travel ban 
since Trump replaced the previous travel ban); Michael D. Shear, Trump Imposes New Travel 
Ban on 7 Countries, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2017, at A1 (noting the new travel ban rendered the 
previous orders, and related issues, moot); Michael D. Shear & Ron Nixon, Ban on Travel Will 
Be Replaced With New Schedule of Targeted Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2017, at A11. 
132 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 592 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
133 See Civil Rights Challenges to Trump Refugee/Visa Order, C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE (July 
21, 2018), https://www.clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=44 
[https://perma.cc/5Q3T-M4KX].  See also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008); infra 
Section III.B.2. 
134 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018). 
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only prerequisite for such action is that the President finds that “entry of 
the covered aliens would be detrimental to the interests of the national 
interest [of the United States].”135 
2. Does the U.S. Constitution Apply to a Cross-Border Shooting or Does 
Impunity Reign? 
In Hernandez v. Mesa, the Supreme Court was confronted with the 
tragic cross-border shooting and killing by a border patrol agent of a 
fifteen-year-old Mexican national playing with friends in a cement culvert 
separating Ciudad Juárez from El Paso.136  The Court had agreed to review 
three questions:  (1) whether the child’s parents may assert any Bivens-
based claim for damages against the agent; (2) whether the shooting 
violated the Fourth Amendment; and (3) whether qualified immunity 
mandates dismissal of the parents’ Fifth Amendment due process claim.137  
The Court remanded the Bivens claim in light of its preceding Abbasi 
decision and also the Fourth Amendment question, which “is sensitive 
and may have consequences that are far reaching.”138  With respect to the 
Fifth Amendment claim, the Court held that the en banc Fifth Circuit had 
erred in granting the border agent qualified immunity premised on the 
alien status of the child who had no significant voluntary connections to 
the United States.139  The Court noted “however, that Hernández’s 
nationality and the extent of his ties to the United States were unknown to 
Mesa at the time of the shooting.”140  After reciting relevant qualified 
immunity principles, including analysis of “the facts that were knowable 
to the defendant officers,” the Court concluded that the lower court erred 
                                                
135 Id. 
136 See Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2005 (2017) (per curiam) (recounting the death 
of Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca).  The opinion recites the complex procedural history 
regarding the underlying motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety.  Id. at 2005–06. 
137 Id. at 2004–05. 
138 Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2007.  This language implicitly reflects a pragmatic approach to 
the competing positive law and natural law interests at stake.  How this is contextually 
resolved remains for future judicial resolution.  Justice Thomas dissented on this point, 
however, and simply concluded that Bivens cannot be extended beyond its original context.  
Id. at 2008 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
139 Id. at 2007.  See also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008).  The Court in 
Boumediene reasoned:  “Even when the United States acts outside its borders, its powers are 
not ‘absolute and unlimited’ but are subject ‘to such restrictions as are expressed in the 
Constitution.’”  Id. (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885)). 
140 Hernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 2007.  This statement is an express acknowledgement of the 
agent’s perspective “from above,” even if its ultimate weight in the case’s outcome on 
remand remains to be measured.  The child’s perspective, however, has yet to enter judicial 
consciousness. 
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in granting the motion to dismiss because of qualified immunity, but the 
issue could be raised again on remand.141 
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg dissented in part and concluded that the 
Fourth Amendment claim, remanded for further analysis, should go 
forward.142  The dissent set forth six sets of legal and policy principles that 
legally cemented the border culvert between the United States and Mexico 
“as having sufficient involvement with, and connection to, the United 
States to subject the culvert to Fourth Amendment protections.”143  In their 
view, the Fourth Amendment issue was, therefore, proper for resolution 
on the merits, although they agreed with the remand of the Bivens and 
Fifth Amendment qualified immunity questions for further pre-trial 
analysis.144  On remand, the Fifth Circuit held that extending Bivens in the 
case would be improper because doing so would “interfere with the 
political branches’ oversight of national security and foreign affairs,” and 
because it “would create a remedy with uncertain limits.”145  
However, in Rodriguez v. Swartz, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a 
U.S. border patrol agent was not entitled to qualified immunity when he 
shot across the border and killed a teenage Mexican citizen without any 
legal justifications, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.146  The Ninth 
Circuit also allowed the extension of Bivens because there was no other 
adequate remedy available, it was not clear that Congress deliberately 
chose to preclude a remedy, and no policy factors precluded such a 
remedy.147  The judicial treatment Rodriguez receives going forward may 
be of great significance. 
3. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) broadly shields 
foreign states from suits in U.S. courts with very limited exceptions.148  
                                                
141 Id. (citing White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 (2017) (per curiam)). 
142 Id. at 2008.  The dissent cited to Wood v. Moss for the prior extension of Bivens to Fourth 
Amendment claims.  Id. at 2008 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 
2065 (2014)). 
143 Id. at 2011 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
144 Id at 2007. 
145 Hernandez v. Mesa, 885 F.3d 811, 823 (5th Cir. 2018).  See also Adam Liptak, Two U.S. 
Agents Fired into Mexico Killing Teenagers.  Only One Faces a Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/20/us/politics/agents-border-killings-
supreme-court.html [https://perma.cc/5BKA-Q7DC] (noting that the Supreme Court has 
been hesitant to extend Bivens). 
146 See Rodriguez v. Swartz, 899 F.3d 719, 731, 748 (9th Cir. 2018) (stating that the teen killed 
had a “Fourth Amendment right to be free from the objectively unreasonable use of deadly 
force by an American agent acting on American soil”). 
147 See id. at 748. 
148 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976). 
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Foreign sovereign immunity is a powerful jurisdictional bar, as was 
reiterated in Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.149  At issue therein was 
whether the “expropriation exception” to immunity was applicable when 
private property rights are taken in violation of international law.150  
Minimizing its review of the disputed factual background arising from 
nationalized oil drilling rights in Venezuela, the Supreme Court focused 
instead on sovereign immunity’s power to mandate early dismissal of 
claims.151  Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer’s opinion 
significantly increased the pleading burden in FSIA cases by requiring the 
plaintiff to establish a sovereign immunity exception with certainty.152  The 
Court’s holding built upon threshold jurisdictional principles set forth in 
Verlinden, further enshrined governmental immunity’s outcome-
determinative power at the very onset of legal proceedings, and advanced 
Verlinden’s immunity policy analysis, which supports sparing the 
government from the significant burdens of defending litigation.153  The 
United States, despite its adversarial diplomatic posture toward 
Venezuela, filed an amicus brief in support of Venezuela, arguing in favor 
of the strong presumption of governmental immunity, buttressed by 
comity principles.154  The Supreme Court’s powerfully reiterated 
impunity doctrine resonates with positive law theory and expressly 
                                                
149 Bolivarian Republic Venez. v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312, 
1322–23 (2017). 
150 Id. at 1314–16 (“The expropriation exception applies to ‘any case . . . in which rights in 
property taken in violation of international law are in issue and that property . . . is owned 
or generated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state . . . engaged in a commercial 
activity in the United States.’”). 
151 See id. at 1321 (stating that sovereign immunity typically shields sovereigns from suits).  
Comity principles are often factored into the sovereign immunity analysis.  See, e.g., Hilton 
v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 143 (1895) (articulating comity as “the recognition which one nation 
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, 
having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own 
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws”).  Comity analysis has 
blossomed in international human rights cases as another gate-closing doctrine that further 
supports governmental impunity.  See, e.g., Harlan S. Abrams & Brian E. Mattis, The Duty to 
Decide vs. the Daedalian Doctrine of Abstention, 1 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1, 12. 
152 Bolivarian Republic Venez., 137 S. Ct. at 1316.  But see Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) 
(holding that federal courts have jurisdiction in cases arising under the Constitution that are 
not “wholly insubstantial and frivolous”).  Bell no longer rings like a clarion call to liberally 
construe the plaintiff’s claims in civil and human rights cases. 
153 See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493–94 (1983) (addressing the 
concerns that foreign relations in the United States have regarding federal questions).  See 
also Bolivarian Republic Venez., 137 S. Ct. at 1318–19 (discussing the FSIA’s exceptions to 
foreign immunity). 
154 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 20, 
Bolivarian Republic Venez. v. Helmerich & Payne Int’l Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 1312 (2017) 
(No. 15-423), 2016 WL 4524346, at *1.  When it comes to shared sovereign immunity interests, 
hostile governments can jointly act like a band of brothers. 
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forecloses a plaintiff’s ability to overcome jurisdictional barriers under 
FSIA (or otherwise) by emphasizing the plaintiff’s injuries or, as disdained 
by the Court, “through artful pleading.”155  Simply put:  pleader beware!156 
However, the Supreme Court earlier held in Samantar that FSIA 
immunity does not extend to foreign officials.157  Therefore, the door has 
been left slightly ajar for torture victims to recover damages directly from 
their foreign torturers, assuming that they have reachable assets.158  On 
remand in Samantar, the district court denied the individual defendants’ 
sovereign immunity motion to dismiss, and later entered a $21 million 
damages judgment against a Somali government actor found liable for 
torture dating back to the 1980s.159  Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed the denial of individual immunity.160 
Also, plaintiffs have been successful in overcoming FSIA 
governmental immunity when, for strategic or political reasons, the 
foreign state decides not to participate in the case.  In Leibovitch, for 
example, a default judgment of $67 million was entered regarding a 2003 
highway terrorist attack by members of Palestine Islamic Jihad, funded in 
part by Iran.161  However, efforts to collect Iranian assets have been 
judicially frustrated, and the estate of a seven-year-old Israeli girl, her 
permanently disabled three-year-old sister (an American citizen), and 
surviving family members continues its seemingly quixotic search for 
justice.162  In Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the Seventh Circuit reviewed 
the earlier District of Columbia District Court $71.5 million default 
judgment against the Islamic Republic of Iran under the state sponsor of 
terrorism exception to FSIA immunity because Iran provided material 
support to Hamas suicide bombers who grievously injured eight U.S. 
                                                
155 OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 136 S. Ct. 390, 396 (2015).  See supra note 7 and 
accompanying text (noting how immunity doctrine resonates with positive law theory). 
156 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671 (2009) (commanding lower courts to review more 
aggressively plaintiff’s jurisdictional pleadings in analyzing motions to dismiss under the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
157 Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 325–26 (2010).  Of course, officials who allegedly 
engaged in torture or other human rights violations may raise a panoply of other defenses 
during the course of legal proceedings.  Id at 324–25. 
158 Id. 
159 See Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2011 WL 7445583, at *1 (E.D. Va. Feb. 15, 2011) 
(denying motion); Yousuf v. Samantar, No. 1:04cv1360, 2012 WL 3730617, at *16 (E.D. Va. 
Aug. 28, 2012) (entering judgment). 
160 Yousuf v. Samantar, 699 F.3d 763, 778 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 897 (2014). 
Separately, a federal bankruptcy court held that the judgment against the defendant was 
non-dischargeable because the asserted injuries were caused by willful and malicious 
conduct.  Yousuf v. Samantar, 537 B.R. 250, 256 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2015). 
161 Leibovitch v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 852 F.3d 687, 689 (7th Cir. 2017). 
162 See id.  But see Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1329 (2016) (granting summary 
judgement for plaintiffs). 
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citizens in Jerusalem.163  Over a decade of fruitless post-judgment legal 
proceedings followed in multiple jurisdictions to attach and execute on 
Iranian assets, including the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that ancient 
Persian art and artifacts located in four Chicago collections were beyond 
reach.164  The Supreme Court announced in June 2017 that it would hear 
the case and determine whether the ancient artifacts could be used to pay 
the default judgment.165  After setting forth a sweeping history of foreign 
sovereign immunity law, the Court unanimously held that the ancient 
artifacts could not be used to pay the default judgment.166 
Two cases pending before the Supreme Court in the 2018–19 term may 
further elucidate the scope of FSIA immunity.  At issue in Republic of Sudan 
v. Harrison167 is whether a plaintiff who sues a foreign state under FSIA 
may effectuate service of legal process by mail sent to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs “via” or in “care of” the foreign state’s embassy in the 
United States.168  Of significance to this Article is the perspective of the 
United States.  The case concerns a notorious 2000 al-Qaeda attack on the 
U.S.S. Cole while refueling in Aden, Yemen, which killed seventeen 
American sailors, injured forty-two more, and resulted in a default 
judgment of $314 million in damages.169  Nevertheless, the United States 
filed an amicus curiae brief170 in support of Sudan arguing that allowing 
service via embassies will generally undermine sovereign immunity and 
embassy protections under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations and harm its ability to defend itself in foreign litigation, 
                                                
163 See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that more 
than a decade of litigation followed to attempt to collect the unpaid judgement from Iran). 
164 See id. at 473. 
165 See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 137 S. Ct. 2326, 2327 (2017).  See also Lawrence 
Hurley, U.S. Top Court Takes up Fight over Ancient Persian Artifacts, REUTERS (June 27, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-court-iran/u-s-top-court-takes-up-fight-over-
ancient-persian-artifacts-idUSL1N1JO0MB [https://perma.cc/M99K-7CJN]. 
166 See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 138 S. Ct. 816, 826–27 (2018). 
167 Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 802 F.3d 399 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2671 
(2018).  See also Adam Liptak, A Thought Experiment in Court Over How to Sue a Country, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2018, at A13 [hereinafter Liptak, Thought Experiment]; Robert Barnes, Supreme 
Court Seems Divided on Whether Sudan Properly Served with USS Cole Lawsuits, WASH. POST 




168 Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 802 F.3d 399, 402, 405 (2d Cir. 2015). 
169 Liptak, Thought Experiment, supra note 167. 
170 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Republic of Sudan 
v. Harrison, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (No. 16-1094), 2018 WL 4043178, at *10–26. 
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including the approximately 1000 lawsuits pending in over 100 
countries.171 
At issue in Jam v. International Finance Corp.172 is whether the 
International Organizations Immunities Act,173 which grants commercial 
organizations the “same immunity” granted to foreign governments, 
must be interpreted consistent with the scope of immunity granted foreign 
sovereigns when the Act was passed in 1945.174  Harmed fishermen and 
farmers near the Tata Mundra Power Plant in India, financed by the 
International Finance Corporation, contend that the Act must be 
interpreted consistent with the evolution of immunity law under FSIA, 
which does not currently extend to commercial acts.175 
4. Judicial Narrowing of the Alien Tort Statute 
The human rights community widely views Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co. as a catastrophic gate-closing ukase for greatly expanding the 
“presumption against extraterritoriality” doctrine.176  This doctrine 
forecloses jurisdiction and thereby immunizes conduct outside the U.S. 
unless Congress expressly states otherwise—language absent from the 
1789 Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) enactment.177  Commentary on Kiobel is 
expansive, including commentary by Justice Breyer, author of the main 
concurring opinion.178  Justice Breyer’s concurrence rejected the concept of 
universal jurisdiction, even if the alleged international torts rise to the 
level of hostis humani generis or internationally condemned violations of 
                                                
171 The specific immunity argument raised by the U.S. is whether Article 22 of the Vienna 
Convention, which states that “[t]he premises of [the embassy] shall be inviolable,” prohibits 
service in this manner.  Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22(1), 23 U.S.T. 3237, 
500 U.N.T.S. 106.  See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (No. 16-1094), 2018 WL 4043178, at *20–
21. 
172 Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 860 F.3d 703 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2026 (2018). 
173 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b). 
174 Jam v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 860 F.3d 703, 704 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
175 Id. at 704–05.  See generally Richard Garnett, Precarious Employment?  Varying Approaches 
to Foreign Sovereign Immunity in Labor Disputes, 51 INT’L LAW. 25 (2018) (providing 
background and application of the FSIA “commercial activity” exception to immunity). 
176 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670 (2013).  The Nigerian 
plaintiffs in Kiobel alleged that the international oil corporation, which has extensive and 
multifaceted operations in the United States, aided and abetted the Nigerian government in 
the commission of multiple human rights violations against the local population in order to 
advance oil exploration in the Ogoni River Delta region.  Id. at 1662–63. 
177 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.  See also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The Alien 
Tort Statute grants subject matter jurisdiction over civil suits brought by aliens alleging 
tortious violations of international treaties under customary international law.  Id. 
178 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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law.179  Kiobel’s impact is significant because, since the landmark Filartiga 
decision in 1980, federal courts had been, albeit with judicial croaks and 
groans, slowly opening jurisdictional doors and expanding the scope of 
international human rights claims actionable under the ATS to encompass 
torture and related abuses, corporate connivance with governmental 
human rights abuses, and even befoulment of the environment.180  The 
Supreme Court held earlier, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, that federal courts 
were open to foreigners who claim they are the victims of human rights 
abuses anywhere in the world if the egregious conduct violated norms of 
international law and if the defendant is either present in the U.S. or has 
significant interests in the U.S. to establish personal jurisdiction.181  Post-
Kiobel, however, international human rights justice has been stymied by 
deference to the power of foreign governmental interests and 
international corporations and the ongoing failure of Congress to update 
the 1789 enactment to reflect contemporary international entanglements 
between countries in military and economic affairs. 182 
The post-Kiobel legal tsunami of decisions dismissing human rights 
cases against powerful corporate and governmental interests has 
reverberated all the way to South Africa.  The Khulumani Support Group 
sued twenty banks and corporations in 2002—eleven years before Kiobel—
and alleged that corporate conduct during the apartheid era in South 
Africa supported and enabled human rights abuses against the majority 
black population.183  The Khulumani plaintiffs detailed the defendants’ 
support of South African industries that economically enriched and 
entrenched the apartheid government and allegedly made these 
defendants complicit in human rights abuses, which caused specific 
                                                
179 See BREYER, supra note 122, at 134–64.  See also BAZYLER, supra note 7, at 179–81. 
180 BAZYLER, supra note 7, at 180.  See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(placing great importance on human rights, especially the right not to be tortured).  The 
holding was later codified by the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, as a note in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350 (1991).  See, e.g., Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 
73 (codified as note in 28 U.S.C. § 1350).  See also infra Section III.B.7 (discussing the Torture 
Victim Protection Act). 
181 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 700–02 (2004).  The ATS does not expressly 
address who can be sued thereunder nor does it limit jurisdiction over any defendant 
contingent on the physical location of the tort or the defendant.  See BAZYLER, supra note 7, at 
330. 
182 In other relevant contexts, Congress has statutorily narrowed sovereign immunity.  The 
Federal Tort Claims Act, for example, sets forth a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that 
allows individuals to pursue personal injury or death claims against the federal government 
when caused by government employees.  28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). 
183 See In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 56 F. Supp. 3d 331, 331–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). See also 
Apartheid Reparations Lawsuits (re So. Africa), BUS. & HUM. RTS. RES. CTR. (Oct. 9, 2017), 
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/apartheid-reparations-lawsuits-re-so-africa 
[https://perma.cc/4YTH-GJ8B] (collecting analysis of other ATS lawsuits). 
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injuries to the plaintiffs.184  During the protracted legal proceedings, Kiobel 
was decided, and ultimately the Khulumani lawsuit was dismissed due to 
failure to establish a sufficient United States nexus between the conduct of 
the remaining defendants, IBM and Ford, and specific human rights 
abuses by the former apartheid government.185  Thus, international justice 
for these apartheid victims was foreclosed.  In an ironic later development, 
the current South African government, controlled by the former 
revolutionary African National Congress party, formally notified the 
United Nations of its plan to leave the International Criminal Court 
because it “is in conflict and inconsistent with” South African law granting 
government officials “diplomatic immunity.”186  Former Constitutional 
Court of South Africa Justice Richard Goldstone starkly criticized this 
post-revolutionary turn backward toward impunity as “unfortunate on 
legal, moral and political grounds.”187  Also, South African President Jacob 
Zuma survived his eighth no-confidence vote with the support of African 
National Congress National Assembly members, despite dozens of legal 
investigations regarding corruption allegations that have not impacted his 
absolute legal and political immunity.188 
Judicial principles of universal jurisdiction championed by domestic 
courts in Spain and elsewhere are non-starters in the United States under 
the ATS and otherwise, absent the fanciful idea that Congress will enact 
                                                
184 See Apartheid Litig., 56 F. Supp. 3d at 334 (describing plaintiffs’ grievances against IBM).  
Valparaiso University School of Law hosted a four-day symposium in 1987 entitled 
“Perspectives on South African Liberation.”  The symposium essays, edited by the author 
and published by Hamline University School of Law in volume 5 of The Journal of Law and 
Religion 259 (1987), addressed, inter alia, the intertwined governmental and corporate 
foundation of apartheid, which was immune from legal challenge, and whether apartheid 
positivist law was morally worthy of obedience.  
185 See In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 117, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissed by 
Ntsebeza v. Ford Motor Co).  See also Apartheid Litig., 56 F. Supp. 3d at 334. 
186 Sewell Chan & Marlise Simons, South Africa to Withdraw from International Criminal 
Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/ 
world/africa/south-africa-international-criminal-court.html [https://perma.cc/E8H8-
XNQ6].  See also Marlise Simons, South Africa Should Have Arrested Sudan’s President, I.C.C. 
Rules, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/world/africa/icc-
south-africa-sudan-bashir.html [https://perma.cc/T5JR-U9AW] (stating that South African 
courts informed South African diplomats that they were required to arrest Omar Hassan al-
Bashir). 
187 Chan & Simons, supra note 186.  Perhaps readers will recall the prescient lyrics of The 
Who in Won’t Get Fooled Again:  “Meet the new boss / same as the old boss.”  THE WHO, 
WON’T GET FOOLED AGAIN (Track Records 1971). 
188 See Gabrielle Steinhauser, South African President Survives a Strong Challenge, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 9, 2017, at A5.  See also South African’s President Survives His Toughest Challenge Yet, 
ECONOMIST (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2017/ 
08/09/south-africas-president-survives-his-toughest-challenge-yet [https://perma.cc/ 
UG3B-GBN8]. 
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specific statutory language to expand subject matter jurisdiction to 
foreclose immunity for U.S. actors whose salacious international deeds are 
outsourced to non-U.S. actors.189  Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
recently resolved an appeal that consolidated five extremely procedurally 
complex lawsuits that expressly raised the issue not reached in Kiobel of 
whether corporations may ever be sued under the ATS.  The Supreme 
Court held in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC190 that foreign corporations could 
not be defendants under the ATS.191  The majority (5-4) opinion by Justice 
Kennedy traced, in great detail, the relevant history of Congressional and 
Supreme Court developments since passage of the ATS.192  Of course, in 
any case against a government or private actor in which subject matter 
jurisdiction has been established, additional immunity and other defenses 
await resolution. 
A trial had been scheduled in September 2017 in Salim v. Mitchell to 
determine whether two psychologists working under CIA contracts 
should be held accountable under the ATCA for the torture of two former 
                                                
189 The universal jurisdiction of Spanish courts was established in the Judicial Power 
Organization Act No. 6/1985 of 1 July (Official Gazette No. 157 of 2 July).  The act authorizes 
Spanish jurisdiction where Spaniards or “foreigners outside the national territory” commit 
certain egregious offenses.  Scilingo remains the only case in which Spain has exercised its 
universal jurisdiction and subsequently ordered a criminal sentence.  S.T.S., Oct. 1, 2007 
(R.G.D., No. 798) (Spain) http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/espana/juicioral/ 
doc/sentenciats.html [https://perma.cc/62M8-T46S].  Mr. Scilingo received a 1084-year 
sentence for crimes against humanity committed in Argentina, including genocide, 30 counts 
of murder, 286 of torture, 255 of terrorism, and 93 of causing injury. Id.  See also Aritz Parra, 
Spain’s National Court Drops Probe into Syrian Crimes, FOX NEWS, 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/07/21/spains-national-court-drops-probe-into-
syrian-crimes.html [https://perma.cc/N75N-2K6X].  As of October 2017, over 470,000 
people have been killed in the ongoing civil war in Syria, and nearly half the country’s 
population has been displaced, yet only one human rights war-crime case has been brought, 
in Spain, against Syrian governmental and military officials for well-documented human 
rights atrocities committed during the initial six years of lawlessness.  Id.  However, a panel 
of Spanish judges later decided that the Spanish National Court did not have jurisdiction to 
investigate the case.  Id.  See also The Editorial Board, Frustration Over a War and Its Crimes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2017, at A18.  The complex and frustrated U.N.-created entities charged 
with investigating human rights abuses in Syria appear stymied.  See also Nick Cumming-
Bruce, Ex-Judge Chosen by U.N. to Gather Evidence of Syria War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2017, 
at A5 (reporting that a French judge will prepare evidence of war crimes committed in Syria); 
Anne Barnard et al., As Atrocities Mount in Syria, Justice Seems Out of Reach, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
16, 2017, at A1 (revealing that only a few Syrian war crimes are being pursued by European 
judges). 
190 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018). 
191 Id. at 1403. 
192 See Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Bars Human Rights Suits in the U.S. Against Foreign 
Corporations, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2018, at B2. 
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detainees and the death of one detainee in secret prisons in Afghanistan.193  
Although the U.S. government and CIA officers enjoy sovereign and 
qualified immunity, respectively, the court did not extend such immunity 
to the private actors.194  Both sides made extensive arguments expressly 
referencing German law during the Holocaust and the subsequent human 
rights liability principles resulting from the Nuremberg trials.195  The 
district court denied the psychologists’ renewed motion to dismiss for lack 
of jurisdiction in August 2017 and reiterated that a jury would hear the 
case.196  A confidential settlement was reached promptly thereafter.197  To 
date, no one has been held legally accountable under the ATCA or 
otherwise for torture and other human rights violations arising from the 
“enhanced interrogation” policies and practices implemented in the 
aftermath of September 11.198 
5. The Antiterrorism Act 
Waldman v. PLO, another illustrative gate-closing case, concerned a 
series of terrorist attacks in Israel that killed American and Israeli citizens 
and resulted in a $655.5 million judgment under the Anti-Terrorism Act 
following a seven-week trial on the merits against the Palestinian 
Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization.199  However, the 
                                                
193 Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1123–25 (E.D. Wash. 2016).  See also Sheri Fink 
& James Risen, Lawsuit Aims to Hold 2 Contractors Accountable for C.I.A. Torture, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 28, 2016, at A10 (discussing the aim of Salim). 
194 See Salim 183 F. Supp. 3d at 1130 (explaining qualified immunity for private actors). 
195 See Sheri Fink, 2 Psychologists in C.I.A. Interrogations Can Face Trial, Judge Rules, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 29, 2017, at A18 (offering information on public policy ideas developed after the 
Nuremberg trials).  See also M. Gregg Bloche, When Torture Becomes Science, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
13, 2017, at SR6 (providing a legal and psychiatric summary of case issues); Ariel Dorfman, 
Shakespeare’s Torture Test, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2017, at SR8 (addressing Iago’s evil and the 
necessity of retaining humanity when confronting evil). 
196 See Salim v. Mitchell, 183 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1133 (E.D. Wash. 2017) (denying defendant’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction); Salim v. Mitchell, 268 F. Supp. 3d 1132 (E.D. Wash. 
2017) (denying the psychologists’ motion for summary judgment and stating that similar 
arguments were raised by defendants in a previous motion to dismiss);  Larry Siems, Creators 
of the CIA’s ‘Enhanced Interrogation’ Program to Face Trial, GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/aug/08/cia-torture-program-lawsuit-trial-
enhanced-interrogation [https://perma.cc/NY8U-QS6P]. 
197 See Sheri Fink, Ex-Detainees Reach Settlement With 2 Psychologists in C.I.A. Torture Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2017, at A12; Sara Randazzo, CIA Psychologists, Ex-Detainees, Reach 
Settlement, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2017, at A4. 
198 One of the psychologists in Salim v. Mitchell published a book that explained the 
program and noted that the CIA had awarded medals to the psychologists for their work. 
See JAMES E. MITCHELL & BILL HARLOW, ENHANCED INTERROGATION:  INSIDE THE MINDS AND 
MOTIVES OF THE ISLAMIC TERRORISTS TRYING TO DESTROY AMERICA (Crown Forum 2016). 
199 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (codifying the Antiterrorism Act); Waldman v. PLO, 835 
F.3d 317, 322 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, Sokolow v. PLO, 138 S. Ct. 1438 (2018).  See also 
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Second Circuit vacated the award and ordered that the lawsuit be 
dismissed because of insufficient connection between the Palestinian 
defendants and the United States to meet the jurisdictional demands of 
the Anti-Terrorism Act.200 
6. Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act 
In 2016, Congress overrode a veto by President Obama to enact the 
Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, which amends FSIA and the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, to authorize 
personal jurisdiction over foreign states and civil damages claims in 
specified contexts.201  This legislation is poised to disrupt the longstanding 
international law doctrine that shields foreign governments from 
lawsuits, and it expressly authorizes families of victims of the September 
11 terrorist attacks to sue the Saudi Arabian government for any official 
conduct supportive of the alleged Saudi Arabian conspirators who had 
connections with terrorist groups.202  However, the law has been criticized 
for potentially opening judicial doors for foreign countries to sue U.S. 
military personnel regarding military operations and other conduct 
outside the U.S.203  This criticism, which was accepted by President 
Obama, further illustrates why political and military opposition to 
restricting governmental impunity and qualified immunity for 
government and military actors will ever be in conflict with developing 
civil society norms of human rights “from below.”204 
                                                
Benjamin Weiser, Court Throws Out $655.5 Million Terrorism Verdict Against Palestinian 
Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2016, at A22. 
200 See Waldman, 835 F.3d at 322.  See also 18 U.S.C. § 2334; Int’l Shoe Co. v. Shartel, 279 U.S. 
429, 434 (1929) (setting forth “minimum contacts” analysis to determine if a sufficient 
connection to a particular forum exists for purposes of litigation). 
201 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); 28 U.S.C. § 1605B.  See also Mark Mazzetti, New Law Shifts Fight on 
Claims for 9/11 Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2016, at A1 (examining the interaction between 
the veto and 9/11 lawsuits); Jennifer Steinhauer, Mark Mazzetti & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, 
Congress Allows Saudis to be Sued Over 9/11 Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2016, at A1 
(expounding upon the consequences of the vote to override President Obama’s veto of the 
bill, which allows families of 9/11 victims to sue Saudi Arabia for any role undertaken in the 
plot).  See also Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Obama Vetoes Saudi 9/11 Bill, but Congressional Override 
Is Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2016, at A1. 
202 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605B (placing responsibility on foreign states for terrorist attacks in the 
United States).  See also The Editorial Board, The Risks of Suing the Saudis for 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 28, 2016, at A24 (discussing the problems associated with suing the Saudi Arabian 
government). 
203 See The Risks of Suing the Saudis, supra note 202. 
204 See Brother Against Brother, ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 2017, at 72 (summarizing historical 
analysis dating to the Roman Empire regarding this perpetual conflict and the incomplete 
mission of law to contextually balance these irreconcilable and competing interests of 
governmental inviolability and individual rights). 
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Ongoing U.S. sanctions against Iran for state-sponsored terrorism 
were addressed by the International Court of Justice in Alleged Violations 
of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights,205 
wherein the U.S. argued that Iran’s continuing request for sanctions relief 
under international law would “cause irreparable prejudice to the 
sovereign rights of the United States to pursue its policy towards Iran.”206 
Nevertheless, the court ordered the U.S. to remove any sanctions that 
impede exportation of goods required for humanitarian assistance to 
Iran.207 
7. Sloping Toward Impunity:  The Torture Victim Protection Act, The 
Detainee Treatment Act, and Judicial Foreclosure of a Right of Action 
Thereunder 
Another prominent human rights case and other related precedents 
illustrate the judicial minting of a statutory license to torture due to the 
award of wholesale immunity for such conduct.208  In Vance v. Rumsfeld, 
statutory damages claims stemming from the Iraq War were brought 
against former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who allegedly 
created policies that authorized and resulted in the torture of U.S. civilians 
in Iraq.209  The sharply divided en banc Seventh Circuit (8-3) held that 
neither an implied statutory nor common-law claim for damages should 
be created under Bivens.210  Furthermore, even if such a claim existed 
under the Torture Victim Protection Act (“TVPA”), it could not be brought 
                                                
205 Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights 
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Order, 2018 I.C.J. 175 (Oct. 3).  Iran claims 
that sanctions violate this Treaty between Iran and the United States, 8 U.S.T 899, which was 
signed at Tehran, Iran, on August 15, 1955. 
206 Id. at 24, ¶ 87. 
207 Id. at 26–27, ¶¶ 98, 102. 
208 28 U.S.C. § 1350.  A cause of action was created for U.S. citizens, and foreign nationals, 
to file torture or extrajudicial killing lawsuits.  Id.  See also 10 U.S.C. § 801; 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000dd–2000dd-1 (codifying the Detainee Treatment Act).   
209 See Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 196 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (explaining the torture 
practices used against the defendants).  This decision was consistent with other prior 
decisions that addressed analogous claims.  See, e.g., Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 562 
(4th Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 397 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 
762, 792–93 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 571–81 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  
For the interested reader, the plaintiffs’ complaint was detailed in 387 paragraphs over 79 
pages. The initial merits panel decision in Vance set forth 81 pages of analysis.  That decision 
was vacated and replaced by the en banc opinion that covered 83 pages.  But the majority 
opinion’s consideration of the plaintiffs’ torture and suffering required only four pages of 
attention. 
210 See Vance, 701 F.3d at 201–02.  Although the Detainee Treatment Act authorizes criminal 
prosecution and may have limited civil application to enforce injunctions, the enactment 
expressly blocks damages liability.  
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against Secretary Rumsfeld.211  The majority opinion by Judge 
Easterbrook, which reads like a positivist government’s dream brief, left 
no doubt that even if the torture claim against Secretary Rumsfeld was 
statutorily authorized, it would not survive the “clearly established law” 
high hurdle of qualified immunity because “a public official's inability to 
ensure that all subordinate federal employees follow the law has never 
justified personal liability.”212  Chief Judge Wood’s concurring opinion 
expressly and quite summarily concluded that Secretary Rumsfeld “is 
entitled to qualified immunity.”213 
The dissent flailed at the sweeping scope of immunity “granting the 
entire U.S. military an exemption from all Bivens liability, even to 
civilians.”214  The absolute civil immunity awarded to U.S. military and 
civilian personnel was, the dissent argued, in direct opposition to the 
liability principles of the TVPA, which, analogously, authorizes civil 
remedies for:  (1)  a victim of Syrian military torture, if the torturer is 
located in the U.S.; and (2) family survivors, if the torture results in 
death.215  These remedies, the dissent stated, apply to victims of torture by 
every government in the world, except one:  “civilian U.S. citizens who 
are tortured or worse by our own military have no such remedy.  That 
disparity attributes to our government and to our legal system a degree of 
hypocrisy that is breathtaking.”216 
8. Even the United Nations Enjoys Immunity for Its Own Human Rights 
Violations 
United States federal courts may be closed to human rights cases 
brought against the United Nations—the enshrined protector of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights—because of immunity.217  In 
Georges v. United Nations, tort and contract claims arising from the tragic 
                                                
211 See Editorial, Getting Away with Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2012, at A28 (criticizing 
the opinion’s cynical analysis of the defendant’s significant burden of responding to such 
lawsuits).  Donald Rumsfeld was already retired from office when the lawsuit was filed. 
212 Vance, 701 F.3d at 203.  It is true that high level government officials are not vicariously 
liable for the conduct of their subordinates.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009).  
However, they may be individually liable if they, inter alia, directly supervise illegal conduct 
or fail to supervise or train subordinates to prevent such conduct.  See generally MARTIN A. 
SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION:  CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, § 7.19(c), at 7-239 (4th ed. 
2010). 
213 Vance, 701 F.3d at 206. 
214 Id. at 212 (Hamilton, C.J., dissenting). 
215 Id.  See also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, §§ 2(a), 3(b) (setting forth jurisdiction for an alien’s tort 
suit). 
216 Vance v. Rumsfeld. 701 F.3d 193, 211 (7th Cir. 2012) (Hamilton, C.J., dissenting). 
217 See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) 
(ensuring rights for a standard of living). 
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2010–13 cholera outbreak in Haiti were dismissed because the United 
Nations enjoyed legal immunity under various international 
agreements.218  The outbreak, caused by atrocious U.N. sanitation 
practices, killed more than 9000 innocent civilians and infected over 
800,000 people.219  Still, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal because 
Article II of the U.N. Charter enshrines U.N. immunity unless expressly 
waived.220  Because Article II explicitly details the only restriction on U.N. 
immunity, the Second Circuit determined that immunity must triumph 
over the Haitian victims.221  It is clear from Georges that the sweeping 
immunity held by the United Nations often will present an 
insurmountable hurdle for victims of human rights abuses—even when 
those abuses are clearly caused by the paramount international 
organization entrusted to advance human rights.222 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has primarily focused on judicial foreclosure of civil and 
human rights claims based on judge-created doctrinal immunity policies 
that mirror asserted governmental interests.  In particular, judicial 
analysis of the qualified immunity doctrine inherently requires a de 
minimis focus on the plaintiff’s interests in favor of perfunctory dismissal 
of all claims that are not historically well established, regardless of the 
gravamen of the injuries claimed.  This doctrine and omnipotent 
sovereign immunity enactments, coupled with wholesale judicial 
expansion thereof, undermine core principles of remedial justice and 
significantly impede the progress of law to the detriment of justice “from 
                                                
218 Georges v. United Nations, 84 F. Supp. 3d 246, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, 834 F.3d 88, 90 
(2d Cir. 2016). 
219 See Georges, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 247 (explaining how many Haitians were infected with 
cholera); Georges, 834 F.3d at 90.  See also G.A. Res. 217 (XXV) 1, Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948) (enshrining, inter alia, every person’s right to a standard of 
living adequate for health and well-being); UN Immunity Beats Back Legal Claims by Haitian 
Cholera Victims, Battle Continues, ABA NEWS (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.american 
bar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-archives/2017/02/un_immunity_beatsba.html 
[https://perma.cc/3Y5N-GTCQ] (discussing the fight of Haiti’s cholera victims). 
220 See Georges v. United Nations, 834 F.3d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing 21 U.S.T. 569, 25 
(1970)) (granting legal immunity, in every country, to the United Nations). 
221 See id.  The United Nations must, in an affirmative act of secular positivist zimsum, deign 
to expressly waive its immunity.  That the U.N. did not do so in the Haitian case is a travesty 
of justice. 
222 What would Eleanor Roosevelt, who was unanimously chosen to chair the UN 
Committee that drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the multitude of 
other prominent human rights advocates who advanced the human rights mission of the 
United Nations say about this impunity?  See generally Richard N. Gardner, Eleanor Roosevelt’s 
Legacy:  Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/12/10/ 
opinion/eleanor-roosevelt-s-legacy-human-rights.html [https://perma.cc/5QFJ-KR2Z]. 
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below.”  This legal reality poses a paramount and multifaceted future 
challenge for civil and human rights advocates.  Significant progress in 
U.S. civil rights law in recent decades has advanced across a wide 
spectrum of substantive law.  However, securing remedial damages 
justice against government entities and actors in all substantive fields of 
civil rights and human rights law remains a daunting challenge.  May the 
legal advocates for victims of governmental misconduct ever be immune 
from the Hydra-like limitations on their pursuit of justice for those who 
suffered “from below.”  
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